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Abstract
A relativistic version of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quan-
tum theory is developed on the basis of earlier work by Hartle, and used to discuss
relativistic forms of the paradoxes of spherical wave packet collapse, Bohm’s formula-
tion of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen, and Hardy’s paradox. It is argued that wave function
collapse is not needed for introducing probabilities into relativistic quantum mechan-
ics, and in any case should never be thought of as a physical process. Alternative
approaches to stochastic time dependence can be used to construct a physical picture
of the measurement process that is less misleading than collapse models. In partic-
ular, one can employ a coarse-grained but fully quantum mechanical description in
which particles move along trajectories, with behavior under Lorentz transformations
the same as in classical relativistic physics, and detectors are triggered by particles
reaching them along such trajectories. States entangled between spacelike separate
regions are also legitimate quantum descriptions, and can be consistently handled by
the formalism presented here. The paradoxes in question arise because of using modes
of reasoning which, while correct for classical physics, are inconsistent with the math-
ematical structure of quantum theory, and are resolved (or tamed) by using a proper
quantum analysis. In particular, there is no need to invoke, nor any evidence for, mys-
terious long-range superluminal influences, and thus no incompatibility, at least from
this source, between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.
I Introduction
Three quarters of a century after the establishment of its basic principles the physical in-
terpretation of nonrelativistic quantum theory remains a controversial subject. The math-
ematical structure of the theory, a suitable Hilbert space together with the unitary time
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evolution produced by Schro¨dinger’s equation, is universally accepted. The controversy has
to do with the meaning to be assigned to a wave function, the role of measurements, the
significance of wave function collapse, the interpretation of macroscopic quantum superpo-
sitions (Schro¨dinger’s cat), a proper understanding of entangled states — such as in the
famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox — and similar topics [1]. While a failure
to understand these matters has not prevented the application of quantum theory to an
enormous range of phenomena, it does make the subject confusing and difficult for students,
and for professional physicists who want to apply quantum mechanics to a new domain,
such as quantum information. A good physical theory requires both a sound mathematical
framework and a consistent physical interpretation, and the latter is not entirely satisfactory
in current quantum mechanics textbooks.
The situation does not improve upon going from nonrelativistic to relativistic quantum
mechanics and field theory. The mathematics is more elegant and harder to follow, but
the same conceptual difficulties relating the mathematics to physical reality remain; indeed,
they are worse. Wave function collapse, which is something of an embarrassment for the
nonrelativistic theory, gives rise to serious conceptual problems in the relativistic case, and
there have been numerous discussions about this problem and how to deal with it, among
them [2–12]. The original EPR argument [13] was formulated without reference to relativity
theory. However, the fact that quantum theory predicts violations of Bell’s inequality [14,15],
together with the experimental vindication of this prediction, [16, 17], is nowadays often
interpreted to mean that quantum mechanics is nonlocal in the sense that certain causes can
produce immediate effects a long (macroscopic) distance away [7, 18]. This, of course, calls
into question a basic principle of relativistic physics. In addition there are other quantum
paradoxes, somewhat analogous to EPR, in which Lorentz invariance is an explicit part of
the construction [6, 19–21], and their existence suggests some conflict, or at least a certain
tension, between quantum theory and relativity.
Most paradoxes of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics are closely linked to a single fun-
damental difficulty which the founding fathers did not solve: introducing probabilities into
the theory in a fully consistent way. Conventional textbook quantum theory, following the
lead of von Neumann [22], and London and Bauer [23], employs a deterministic unitary time
development based upon Schro¨dinger’s equation, and then assumes that a measurement will,
for some reason, have a random outcome whose probability can be calculated, even though
its existence cannot be justified, using Schro¨dinger’s wave function. Assigning measurements
this special role in a fundamental theory seems rather odd, and generations of students have
been just as perplexed by it as were their teachers. To be sure, a bizarre idea that helps
organize our experience should not be rejected out of hand, and the algorithm by which a
wave function is used to calculate probabilities of measurement outcomes has been extremely
fruitful, with numerous results in very good agreement with experiment. At the same time,
the measurement approach has given rise to an enormous set of conceptual headaches. In
the field of quantum foundations these are referred to collectively as the measurement prob-
lem, and there has been very little progress in solving them [24]. In short, while invoking
measurements makes it possible to calculate probabilities which agree with experiment, in
many other ways this approach to a fundamental understanding of quantum theory causes
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more problems than it solves.
In the last two decades methods based upon the idea of quantum histories (consistent
or decoherent histories) have been used to introduce probabilities into quantum theory in a
consistent way without making any reference to measurement, by treating quantum dynamics
as an inherently stochastic process [27–35]. This allows measurements to be thought of not as
something special, but as particular instances of quantum processes to which quantum theory
assigns probabilities using the same laws which apply to all other processes. The probabilities
of measurement outcomes obtained in this way are identical with those computed using the
older approach, and thus in complete agreement with experiment. But in the new approach
measurements are no longer necessary for interpreting quantum theory, and as a consequence
the measurement problem disappears. This does not mean that quantum mechanics reduces
to classical physics. Instead, its seeming oddities, when properly understood, are seen to
be the consequences of a perfectly consistent mathematical and logical structure, applicable
to both microscopic and macroscopic systems, which differs in crucial respects from that of
classical physics. In brief, quantum reality is different from classical reality, just as relativistic
reality differs from (pre-relativistic) classical reality.
Introducing probabilities in a consistent way without appealing to measurements makes
it possible to resolve or at least tame the paradoxes of nonrelativistic quantum theory, as
shown in detail in Chs. 20 through 25 of [35]. The notion of taming a paradox can be illus-
trated by reference to the well-known twin paradox of relativity theory. Intuitively it seems
surprising that the astronaut who has been traveling for many years at high speed returns to
earth biologically much younger than his stay-at-home twin brother. But (special) relativity
provides a consistent framework which allows us to understand, in both mathematical and
physical terms, why this can be so. This explanation does not, and should not, remove our
surprise when we first encounter the difference between the relativistic idea of time and the
notion of absolute time that seems much closer to our everyday experience. However, once
we understand relativistic principles the twin paradox is no longer a conceptual headache,
an unsolved mystery that calls into question our understanding of physical reality. Instead,
it is a striking illustration of how that reality differs from what we naively expected before
studying it more closely.
The goal of the present paper is to apply the same approach, probabilities not based
on measurement, to relativistic versions of the nonrelativistic paradoxes which have been
successfully tamed by this method, in particular, to relativistic versions of wave function
collapse, EPR, and Hardy’s paradox. Before presenting a brief outline of the rest of the paper,
it is worth noting that there are numerous conceptual difficulties and paradoxes of relativistic
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory which are not addressed in the present paper.
While there is no need to list all of them, one in particular is worth mentioning: the problem
of microlocality, to be distinguished (or so we believe) from that of the macrolocality needed
for discussing the paradoxes just mentioned. Microlocality is associated, at least intuitively,
with the idea that relativistic quantum particles cannot be well localized in regions with
linear dimensions which are too small, nor precisely localized, in a sense which would please
a mathematician, in any finite region. For example, to take the physicist’s point of view, it
does not make sense to think of an electron localized in a region smaller than its Compton
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wavelength. Microlocality comes up in Newton-Wigner states, and in Hegerfeldt’s results on
nonlocalization; see [36–38] for some representative literature. The present paper contains
no attempt to resolve the mysteries of microlocalization; instead the strategy, as in [3, 4],
is to avoid them, by setting up relativistic quantum histories using a coarse-grained length
scale: distances which, though not necessarily macroscopic, are always significantly larger
than the relevant Compton or other length scale which might limit the notion of locality
employed in Sec. III B. The resulting formulation can at best be a good approximation, but
we believe it is still sufficient for taming those paradoxes with which we are concerned, for
they involve quantum correlations which can exist over length scales of centimeters or even,
in the case of light, meters or kilometers. Thus we take the attitude that the problems and
paradoxes of macrolocality can be separated from issues of relativistic microlocality. Should
this be false it would, needless to say, call into question the main results of this paper. (Note
that the histories approach has been applied to some microlocal problems by Omne`s [39].)
In order to make the present work self-contained, Sec. II contains a summary of the
essential ideas of the nonrelativistic histories approach as formulated in [35], and a specific
example is considered in Sec. II D, to make the presentation a bit less abstract. (Here, and
later, we omit the arguments needed to show that various families of histories are consistent or
inconsistent, as they are not needed in order to follow the presentation. A detailed discussion
of consistency conditions and methods for checking them will be found in Chs. 10 and 11
of [35]; a more compact presentation is in [32].) The formulation of relativistic histories
presented in Sec. III follows in the footsteps of earlier work by Hartle [40]. Most of the ideas
are not new, but the way in which they are presented owes something to developments in
the nonrelativistic theory during the last decade. There is one important difference between
our approach and Hartle’s. He employed regions with a finite extent in the time direction,
whereas we use spacelike hypersurfaces which at each point in space are instantaneous in
time. Given that the present formulation is, as explained in the previous paragraph, coarse
grained in space, there is no reason not to think of it as (in some sense) coarse grained in
time, so the difference with Hartle’s formulation may not be all that significant. There is
other work [39,41] which has made use of relativistic histories and it is, we believe, consistent
with the present formulation in so far as they overlap.
The discussion of relativistic paradoxes begins in Sec. IV with the collapse of the wave
function of a single particle emitted in a spherical wave as the result of some nuclear decay.
This, or rather a one-dimensional analog which serves to illustrate the main points, is treated
in some detail, for in resolving (or taming) this paradox one employs most of the ideas needed
to handle relativistic versions of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox as formulated
by Bohm, taken up in Sec. V, and a paradox due to Hardy, considered in Sec. VI. Studying
these three paradoxes suffices, we believe, to expose the basic principles needed to tame other
paradoxes of the same general sort, the kind which tempt one to think that the quantum
world is inhabited by mysterious influences which can propagate at superluminal speeds. One
of our main conclusions is that there are no such influences; belief in them seems to have
arisen through confusion over the proper rules for reasoning about the physical properties
of quantum systems, that is, logical difficulties which are essentially the same in both the
nonrelativistic and the relativistic theory, although relativity adds a few interesting twists.
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Counterfactual forms of relativistic paradoxes are, strictly speaking, outside the scope of the
present paper, because analyzing them requires a relativistic generalization of the formulation
of counterfactual reasoning in [42] and Ch. 19 of [35], and this is not yet available.
A concluding Sec. VII provides a summary both of the principles of relativistic histories
in Sec. III and of the lessons learned through exploring and taming the paradoxes in Secs. IV
to VI.
II Nonrelativistic Quantum Histories
II A Kinematics
There are by now a number of treatments of the basic principles of nonrelativistic quantum
theory from a histories perspective [29, 31–35]. While these differ in some details, the basic
strategy is the same; in what follows we use the notation in [35], where the reader will find
a detailed discussion of various points which, of necessity, are treated in a summary fashion
in the present discussion.
The histories approach starts with the idea, which goes back to von Neumann, Sec. III.5
of [22], that any property of a quantum system at a given instant of time corresponds to a
subspace of the quantum Hilbert space, and the negation of this property to the orthogonal
complement of this subspace [43]. Equivalently, a property is represented by a projector
P (orthogonal projection operator) onto the subspace in question, and its negation by the
projector I − P , where I is the identity operator. Such properties cannot, in general, be
combined with one another in the manner which is possible in classical physics. For example,
for a spin-half particle the property that the z component of angular momentum be positive,
Sz = +1/2 in units of h¯, corresponds to a one-dimensional subspace in the Hilbert space,
as does its counterpart Sx = +1/2 for the x component of angular momentum. In classical
physics one would then be able to make sense of the conjunction of these two properties: Sz =
+1/2 AND Sx = +1/2. But in quantum theory this is not possible, at least without altering
the rules of logic as suggested by Birkhoff and von Neumann [44]: Sz = +1/2 AND Sx =
+1/2 is not a meaningful proposition, as it corresponds to no subspace in the Hilbert space,
nor is its negation Sz = −1/2 OR Sx = −1/2 a meaningful proposition. (For more details,
see [33,35].) In the histories approach two propositions which stand in such a relationship are
called incompatible, and the basic strategy for avoiding the contradictions associated with
nonrelativistic quantum paradoxes is to insist that all valid quantum descriptions consist
of compatible entities: properties, histories, etc. In particular, properties corresponding to
subspaces whose projectors do not commute with each are always incompatible.
A quantum history is a sequence of quantum properties at a succession of times, say
t0 < t1 < t2 < · · · < tf , (1)
and has the form
Y α = P α00 ⊙ P α11 ⊙ P α22 ⊙ · · · ⊙ P αff , (2)
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where P
αj
j is some projector representing a property of the system at the time tj . The αj
is a label which differentiates this projector from other projectors representing alternative
properties which the system might possess at this time. The collection of such projectors at
time tj form a decomposition of the identity {P αjj }, or
Ij =
∑
αj
P
αj
j . (3)
(The subscript on the identity operator I can be ignored in the nonrelativistic case, but is
needed for the relativistic generalization.) The composite label α = (α0, α1, α2 . . . ) on Y in
(2) identifies the history as a whole, and the collection of all histories of this sort (for a fixed
decomposition of the identity at each time) form a sample space of histories. Note that the
superscripts in (2) and (3) are labels, not powers. This usage need not cause any confusion,
since the square of a projector is the projector itself, and thus there is never any need to
raise it to some power. One often considers histories with a fixed initial state of the form
Y α = Ψ0 ⊙ P α11 ⊙ P α22 ⊙ · · · ⊙ P αff , (4)
with Ψ0 a single projector (possibly onto a pure state) independent of α.
While the symbols ⊙ in (2) and (4) can be regarded simply as spacers, equivalent to
commas, it is actually convenient to think of them as a variant of ⊗, the operator for a
tensor product, so that Y α is a projector on the Hilbert space
H˘ = H0 ⊙H1 ⊙H2 · · · ⊙ Hf (5)
of histories, the tensor product of f + 1 copies of the Hilbert space H of the system at a
single time [45]. The product Y αY α¯ of two projectors of the form (2) is zero if α 6= α¯, that
is, if αj is not equal to α¯j for some j. Projectors on H˘ of the form
Y =
∑
α
piαY
α, (6)
where each piα is either 0 or 1, form a Boolean algebra of history projectors, all of which
commute with one another. This Boolean algebra, or the sample space which generates it,
is called a family of histories, and in the histories approach represents the event algebra for
a probability theory.
Whereas families of histories of the form (2) or (4), with the projectors at any given time
coming from a single decomposition (3) of the identity, are the simplest kind to think about,
the histories formalism actually allows for much more general possibilities, see Ch. 14 of [35],
which are sometimes useful. Since including these more general families in a relativistic
theory gives rise to no new problems or issues, the exposition below and in Secs. III and IV
is restricted to the simpler type of family based on (3). (A further generalization allowed by
Isham’s formalism, projectors on the history space (5) which cannot be written as a tensor
product, as in (3), or as a sum of projectors which are themselves tensor products, are
excluded from the present discussion, and from the relativistic generalization given below.
Such histories have yet to be given any physical interpretation.)
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In ordinary probability theory one assumes that one and only one of the mutually ex-
clusive possibilities which make up a sample space (e.g., heads and tails for a tossed coin)
actually occurs. Similarly, in the histories approach to quantum theory, one supposes that
one and only one of the histories which make up the sample space actually takes place in
a given “experimental run”. In addition, if the history Y α for a given α is the one which
actually occurs, the successive projectors in (2) are thought of as representing actual states
of affairs at the times in question. Thus the histories approach, unlike textbook quantum
theory, does not confine its physical interpretation to measurements or the results of mea-
surements. Instead, measurements are physical processes to be analyzed in the same way
as all other physical processes, by constructing appropriate histories of the total quantum
system including the measuring apparatus. This apparatus must be treated as a quantum
mechanical system, since the histories interpretation insists that everything be discussed in
quantum terms without introducing classical elements (except as approximations to quantum
theory). In this way the histories approach eliminates paradoxical elements of nonrelativistic
quantum theory which arise out of treating measurement as a fundamental concept.
II B Dynamics
The time development of a quantum system, in the histories perspective, is fundamentally a
random or stochastic process, and the deterministic, time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
is used as a tool to calculate the probabilities of different histories. (To be sure, the theory
allows for deterministic histories in which later events follow with probability one from some
initial condition. But such “unitary” histories are exceptional cases; most histories which
are of interest in connection with actual laboratory experiments are not of this form.) As
is well know, by integrating Schro¨dinger’s equation for a closed quantum system one can
obtain a collection of unitary time development operators, denoted here by T (t′, t), where
the times t′ and t serve as labels. For a time-independent Hamiltonian H these operators
can be written as
T (t′, t) = exp[−i(t′ − t)H/h¯]. (7)
Whether or not H depends on the time, as long as it is Hermitian the time development
operators satisfy the following conditions,
T (t, t) = I, T (t′′, t′)T (t′, t) = T (t′′, t), T (t′, t) = T †(t, t′) = T−1(t, t′). (8)
for all t, t′, and t′′.
Given the time development operators, a chain operator for the history Y α in (2) can be
defined by writing its adjoint in the form
K†(Y α) = P α00 T (t0, t1)P
α1
1 T (t1, t2)P
α2
2 T (t2, t3) · · ·T (tf−1, tf)P αff , (9)
where the projectors appear in the same order as in (9); the operator K(Y α) is then a
similar product with the operators in the reverse order, and the arguments of each T (t′, t)
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interchanged. The weight of a history is given by
W (Y α) = 〈K(Y α), K(Y α)〉, (10)
where the operator inner product 〈, 〉 is defined by
〈A,B〉 = Tr(A†B), (11)
assuming the trace exists. In the case of a family of histories involving just two times, t0
and t1, with an initial state |ψ〉 at t0 and a decomposition of the identity corresponding to
an orthonormal basis |φα〉 at t1, the weights are given by
W (Ψ0 ⊙ P α1 ) = |〈φα|T (t1, t0)|ψ〉|2, (12)
where Ψ0 = |ψ〉〈ψ| and P α = |φα〉〈φα|. In this case the weights correspond to the usual Born
transition probabilities, and thus (10) can be thought of as a generalization of the Born rule
to the case of histories involving an arbitrary number of times.
The weights defined in (10) can be combined with whatever initial information one has
about the quantum system in order to assign probabilities to the various histories, in the
same manner as for a classical stochastic process; see Ch. 9 in [35]. Thus, in particular, if the
system is known to have been in the initial state |ψ〉, the weight in (12) give the probabilities
for the history Ψ0⊙P α1 or, equivalently, the probability that the quantum system will be in
the state |φα〉 at t1, given that it was in the state |ψ〉 at t0.
When three or more times are involved, the histories approach imposes additional con-
ditions. In order that a family of histories be acceptable as a possible stochastic description
of a closed quantum system, so that one can assign probabilities to the different histories,
the chain operators of the form (2) must be mutually orthogonal,
〈K(Y α), K(Y α¯)〉 = 0 for α 6= α¯, (13)
where 〈, 〉 is the operator inner product (11). These are the consistency conditions or deco-
herence conditions, and the left side of (13) is often referred to as a decoherence functional.
(Various alternative consistency conditions have been proposed from time to time; the one
encountered most often is that in which the real part of the operator inner product in (17)
rather than the product itself is set equal to 0.) A family of histories for which (13) is
satisfied is called a consistent family or framework. A meaningful description of a quantum
system in physical terms is always based upon some framework.
The weights W and the consistency conditions can also be expressed in terms of Heisen-
berg projectors and chain operators, defined in the following way. Let tr be some reference
time; its value is unimportant as long as it is held fixed. Then for each projector entering a
history of the form (4), let the corresponding Heisenberg projector be defined by
Pˆ
αj
j = T (tr, tj)P
αj
j T (tj , tr). (14)
The corresponding Heisenberg chain operator is
Kˆ†(Y α) = Pˆ α00 Pˆ
α1
1 Pˆ
α2
2 · · · Pˆ αff , (15)
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which is (formally) simpler than (9) in that time development operators do not appear on
the right side. It is then easy to check that (10) and (13) are equivalent to
W (Y α) = 〈Kˆ(Y α), Kˆ(Y α)〉, (16)
〈Kˆ(Y α), Kˆ(Y α¯)〉 = 0 for α 6= α¯. (17)
Note that the operators on the right side on (15) do not (in general) commute with each
other, and hence the order is important. Interchanging this order by using, for example,
Pˆ α00 Pˆ
α2
2 Pˆ
α1
1 in place of Pˆ
α0
0 Pˆ
α1
1 Pˆ
α2
2 for a history based on the three times t0 < t1 < t2 will
(in general) change the value of the weight in (16). Thus keeping track of the temporal
order of events is important if one wants to have physically meaningful results. On the other
hand, writing the projectors on the right side of (15) in reverse order, with Pˆ
αf
f at the left
and Pˆ α00 at the right, merely replaces Kˆ
†(Y α) with its adjoint Kˆ(Y α), and this does not
alter W (Y α) nor, if the change is made for all the histories in a family, does it alter the
consistency conditions (17). Consequently, the histories interpretation is invariant under a
reversal of the direction of time. (Note that this is quite a different issue from time-reversal
invariance of the Hamiltonian, which manifests itself in properties of the unitary operators
T (t′, t).)
II C Refinement and compatibility
Let F be a family of histories based upon decompositions of the identity of the form (3) at
a set of times given by (1). We shall say that a second family G is a refinement of F (or F
is a coarsening of G) provided two conditions are satisfied.
1. The collection of times at which G is defined includes all those at which F is defined,
and perhaps some additional times.
2. At each of the times for which F is defined, G is based upon the same decomposition
of the identity (3) as F , or else upon a finer decomposition of the identity, one in which
at least one, and possibly more, of the projectors in the original decomposition has been
replaced by two or more projectors which sum up to the projector which has been replaced.
These two conditions can be collapsed into a single condition if one uses the following
idea. A history of the form (2) specifies certain properties at the times given in (1), and
says nothing about what is happening at any other time. Now one can “extend” the history
(2) to additional times without changing its physical meaning if the identity I is used as a
projector for each added time, because I represents the property which is always true, and
therefore its occurrence tells us nothing we did not already know. Given two families of
histories which are not initially defined at the same set of times, we can always extend the
histories in the manner just indicated so that we have equivalent families defined at a larger
set of times, which are now the same for both families. If we allow for such an “automatic
extension”, then G is a refinement of F if and only if at each time where the histories in both
families (of extended histories) are defined, the decomposition of the identity for G is the
same or finer than that for F . Note that according to this definition, a family F is always a
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refinement of itself. Also note that a refinement G of a consistent family F may or may not
be consistent.
Two frameworks F and F ′ are said to be compatible provided they possess a common
refinement which is itself a consistent family or framework. That is, there must be some
family G which is both a refinement of F and a refinement of F ′, and which satisfies the
consistency conditions. Since according to the definition given above, a family is always (for-
mally) a refinement of itself, G could be F or F ′. Indeed, if one framework is a refinement
of another, the two are compatible. Frameworks which are not compatible are called incom-
patible. There are two slightly different ways in which two frameworks can in incompatible.
The first is that, as families, they have no common refinement: this means that at at least
one of the times of interest the two decompositions of the identity contain projectors which
do not commute with each other. One might call this “kinematical incompatibility”. But
even if a common refinement exists, it need not satisfy the consistency conditions, leading
to “dynamical incompatibility.”
A central principle of histories quantum theory is the single framework rule (or single
family, or single set rule): a quantum description must be constructed using a single con-
sistent family, and results from two or more incompatible frameworks cannot be combined.
This is an extension to histories of the principle illustrated at the beginning of Sec. II A
using the x and z components of angular momentum of a spin-half particle, and in the case
of kinematic incompatibility can be justified on precisely the same basis: the mathematics
of the Hilbert space structure of quantum theory as interpreted by von Neumann requires,
if one takes it seriously as representing physical reality, some changes in the way one thinks
about that reality. Incompatibility in this sense is a quantum concept that does not arise
in classical physics, and thus there is no good classical analogy for the single framework
rule. Many paradoxes of nonrelativistic quantum theory involve some violation of the sin-
gle framework rule (see the discussion in Chs. 20 to 25 of [35]), and the histories approach
avoids these paradoxes by strictly enforcing this rule, which plays an equally important role
in relativistic quantum theory.
To complete this discussion, we note that when one uses the histories approach, wave
function collapse is completely absent from the fundamental principles of quantum theory.
If one treats quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory, then various physical consequences
can be worked out by using the standard tools of probability theory, in particular, by com-
puting appropriate conditional probabilities. For example, suppose that a measurement has
a probability 1/3 to turn out one way, apparatus pointer directed to the left, and 2/3 to turn
out a different way, pointer directed to the right. If the experiment is carried out and at
the end the pointer points to the left, then probability theory allows one to calculate various
probabilities using “pointer points to the left” as a condition. Wave function collapse as seen
from a histories perspective provides a way (sometimes, but not always, a useful way) to
calculate certain conditional probabilities which can also be computed by alternative meth-
ods. In particular, wave function collapse is not a mysterious physical phenomenon produced
by an equally mysterious measurement process. One should think of it as something which
occurs in the theoretical physicist’s notebook, not in the experimental physicist’s laboratory!
(In addition, we shall sometimes use the term “collapse” in a metaphorical sense to indicate
10
the point at which a family of histories branches, as in (43).)
II D Example using spin half
It is helpful to see how the formalism described above applies to a particular simple example,
that of the spin degree of freedom of a spin-half particle in zero magnetic field, so T (t′, t) = I,
the identity operator. Suppose that the initial state at t0 is |z+〉 corresponding to Sz = +1/2
in units of h¯, and that at later times we use a decomposition of the identity
I = z+ + z−, (18)
where z+ is the projector |z+〉〈z+|, and z− the projector for Sz = −1/2. Histories of the
form (4) based on the initial state z+ then form a family
F0: z+ ⊙ {z+, z−} ⊙ {z+, z−} ⊙ · · · , (19)
in which each history begins with z+, followed at later times by one of the possibilities
z+ or z−. Because T = I, every history has zero weight or zero probability, apart from
z+ ⊙ z+ ⊙ z+ ⊙ · · · , which has probability one. In this example, and in many of those we
will consider later, most histories have zero weight and only a few occur with probability
greater than zero. In such cases it is convenient to employ a shorthand in which rather than
listing all possible histories, as in (19), one shows only those that have positive probability,
the support of the consistent family. In this shorthand (19) is replaced with
F0: z+ ⊙ z+ ⊙ z+ ⊙ · · · , (20)
and there is no harm in referring to it as the “framework F0” in place of the more precise
“support of F0”. (While displaying the support is usually adequate for indicating the family
one has in mind, it does not always determine unambiguously the decompositions of the
identity, and sometimes one has to be more specific about which histories of zero weight are
to included in the family.) In the remainder of this paper we will use this shorthand without
further comment.
The unitary family (20) in which each of the projectors (in the support) is equal to its
predecessor under the unitary map produced by the time development operator is a rather
special sort of quantum description. In practice one usually deals with stochastic frameworks,
such as
F1: z+ ⊙
{
x+ ⊙ x+ ⊙ x+ ⊙ · · · ,
x− ⊙ x− ⊙ x− ⊙ · · · , (21)
where x+ and x− are projectors on the states Sx = ±1/2. The support of this consistent
family consists of two histories, both having the same initial state, and each occurring with
probability of 1/2. In the first history Sz = +1/2 at t0 and Sx = +1/2 at t1 and all
later times. It is somewhat misleading to think of this history as one in which “the spin is
pointing in the z direction” at t0 and “the spin is pointing in the x direction” at t1 and later
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times, for this suggests that there is some torque acting between t0 and t1 to make the spin
precess, whereas we are assuming there is no magnetic field present, and therefore no torque.
Instead, the difference between F0 and F1 is that in the former one has chosen to describe
the z component, and in the latter the x component, of spin angular momentum at times
later than t0. A description of a classical spinning object which specifies one component,
say Lz of its angular momentum at an earlier time and a different component, say Lx, at
a later time tells one nothing about the direction of the total angular momentum at either
time, and this is a helpful analogy in thinking about the quantum case, where Sz = +1/2
does not imply that Sx or Sy is zero.
In F1 the two histories “split”, or diverge from each other, at t1, but there are other
frameworks in which this split occurs later, such as
F2: z+ ⊙ z+ ⊙
{
x+ ⊙ x+ ⊙ · · · ,
x− ⊙ x− ⊙ · · · , (22)
where it occurs at t2. In view of the remarks in the previous paragraph, it is evident that
the presence as well as the timing of such a split — one could also call it a “collapse” —
is not some sort of physical effect. Instead, it arises from the possibility of constructing
various different, incompatible (in the quantum sense) stochastic descriptions of the same
quantum system starting in the same initial state. This does not mean that one of these
descriptions is correct and the others false, but rather that there is no way of combining
them into a single description. This is obvious in the case of F1 and F2 because at t1 the
former assigns a value to Sx and the latter a value to Sz, whereas the Hilbert space does not
allow simultaneous values of two different components of spin angular momentum. In the
same way, both F1 and F2 are incompatible with F0. The choice of which family to use in
a particular circumstance is made by the physicist on the basis of what aspects of the time
development he wants to discuss. If it is Sx at t2, then either F2 or F1 can be used, but not
F0, whereas neither F2 nor F1 can be used to describe Sz at t2. Also note that once a split or
collapse of the kind one finds in F1 or F2 has occurred, it cannot be undone by, for example,
replacing x+ with z+ at t3 in both histories in (22) (or in (21)). Such a family would violate
the consistency conditions, and hence not be a meaningful stochastic description of the time
development of this quantum system.
One can extend this example to include measurements. Let |X〉 represent the initial state
of an apparatus designed to measure Sx, and suppose that during the time interval the total
system of particle plus apparatus undergoes a unitary time evolution given by:
|x+〉 ⊗ |X〉 → |x+〉 ⊗ |X+〉, |x−〉 ⊗ |X〉 → |x−〉 ⊗ |X−〉. (23)
Before and after this time both particle and apparatus remain unchanged. (One can imagine
that the particle passes through the apparatus between t1 and t2, but that for simplicity we
have omitted the center of mass motion of the particle from our description.) It is helpful to
think of |X+〉 and |X−〉 as macroscopically distinct apparatus states, e.g., corresponding to
two positions of a visible pointer. This is an oversimplified but not misleading description of a
quantum measurement; see Sec. 17.4 of [35] for a more realistic approach. (Typical laboratory
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measurements or quantum systems are destructive in the sense that the measured property
is significantly altered in the measurement process. The histories approach handles these
without difficulty, see Ch. 17 of [35], but (23) is a nondestructive model of measurement,
which makes it easier to compare with usual textbook approach.)
Let us suppose that at t0 the combined system is in a state z
+ ⊗ X , i.e., Sz = +1/2
for the particle, and the apparatus in its “ready” state. One possible framework is that of
unitary time evolution of the total system:
G0: Ψ0 ⊙ z+X ⊙ S ⊙ S ⊙ · · · , (24)
where the initial state is
Ψ0 = z
+X ; (25)
omitting the ⊗ between the projectors z+ and X onto the states |z+〉 and |X〉 does not lead
to any ambiguity. The projector S projects onto the state
|S〉 = (|x+〉|X+〉+ |x−〉|X−〉)/√2, (26)
which, since the apparatus is of macroscopic size, is a macroscopic quantum superposition
(MQS) or Schro¨dinger cat state. As a consequence, G0, even though a perfectly correct
quantum description of the time development, is not of much use for discussing the mea-
surement process in physical terms. The reason is that S does not commute with either of
the projectors X+ or X− describing the possible measurement outcomes, so if one uses the
description provided by G0 it is meaningless to ascribe a position to the pointer after the
measurement has taken place.
Of greater utility is the framework
G1: Ψ0 ⊙
{
x+X ⊙ x+X+ ⊙ x+X+ ⊙ · · · ,
x−X ⊙ x−X− ⊙ x−X− ⊙ · · · , (27)
which is the measurement counterpart of F1 in (21). In this family the apparatus is in its
ready state X and the particle is in one of the two states Sx = ±1/2 at t1. At t2 and later
times the state X± of the apparatus reflects the earlier state of the particle, as one would
expect given (23). From the measurement outcome X+ at any time after t2, one can infer
(conditional probability equal to 1) that Sx = +1/2 both before and after the measurement;
similarly X− implies Sx = −1/2 at earlier as well as later times.
The measurement counterpart of F2 is the framework
G2: Ψ0 ⊙ z+X ⊙
{
x+X ⊙ x+X+ ⊙ · · · ,
x−X ⊙ x−X− ⊙ · · · . (28)
It corresponds fairly closely to the traditional “collapse” picture of the measurement process
found in textbooks, since one has unitary time development until the particle interacts with
the apparatus, after which the particle state, x+ or x−, is correlated with the measurement
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outcome state X+ or X−. However, G2 is only one of a collection of equally valid but
mutually incompatible ways of using quantum mechanics to describe the measuring process.
From the point of view of fundamental quantum theory there is no reason to prefer G2 to
the unitary family G0. To be sure, the latter cannot be used to describe the measurement
outcome, for, as pointed out earlier, S does not commute with X+ or X−. Thus from
a practical point of view G2 is more useful than G0. But there is no reason to prefer G2
to G1, and G1 has the advantage that it allows one to think of the measurement process
as a measurement in the usual sense of that term: a procedure by which the macroscopic
outcome reflects a property the measured system had before the measurement takes place. In
practice, most measurements on microscopic quantum systems carried out in the laboratory
can best be thought of using a viewpoint akin to that of G1: a gamma ray is detected
by destroying it, the momentum of a charged particles emerging from a collision vertex is
measured by changing it in a magnetic field, etc. (In these cases (23) is not an appropriate
model, because the measurements are destructive, but the histories approach handles these
equally well, Ch. 17 of [35], and shows that the measurement outcomes are correlated with
quantum states which existed before the measurement interaction.) Descriptions analogous
to G2 play very little role in physics apart from their appearance in textbook lists of quantum
axioms where they have confused generations of students, not because they are wrong, but
because the corresponding “wave function collapse” has been misinterpreted as a physical
phenomenon, rather than just one of many ways of describing quantum time development.
Rectifying that misinterpretation is, as we shall see, the key to untangling several relativistic
quantum paradoxes.
III Relativistic Quantum Histories
III A Kinematics and dynamics
t
x
S0
S1
S2
S3
Figure 1: A possible collection of time-ordered spacelike hypersurfaces.
A plausible generalization of the histories approach described in Sec. II can be carried
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out in the following way. Introduce a collection {Sj}, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , of smooth, infinite,
nonintersecting three-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces, as suggested by the diagram in
Fig. 1. They do not have to be “flat” hyperplanes, but the requirement that no two surfaces
intersect means that if two or more hyperplanes belong to the collection, they must be
parallel. As they do not intersect, the hypersurfaces can be ordered in time, and we assume
that Sj is earlier than Sj+1, with S0 the earliest hypersurface. (These spacelike surfaces
have no thickness in the time direction, unlike the open regions in space-time employed by
Hartle [40], Blencowe [41], and in algebraic quantum field theory [46]. This is consistent
with our decision, Sec. I, to ignore problems of microlocality. Should it be necessary for
technical mathematical reasons to introduce a small but finite thickness or duration in the
time direction, that should not alter our conclusions.)
Next assume that for each hypersurface Sj there is a Hilbert space Hj with identity
operator Ij . Given a decomposition (3) of Ij in projectors, one can define histories of the form
(2) on the history Hilbert space (5). The dynamical laws can be expressed using a collection
of time development operators {Tjk}, where Tjk is a unitary map (bijective isometry) from
Hk onto Hj , the analog of the nonrelativistic T (tj, tk). The conditions analogous to (8) are,
obviously,
Tjj = Ij, TijTjk = Tik, T
†
jk = Tkj. (29)
At this point one could introduce chain operators of the form (9), but for our purposes it
is more convenient to introduce Heisenberg projectors on the Hilbert space Hr of a special
reference hypersurface (or hyperplane) Sr. As we shall ascribe no physical significance to
the Heisenberg projectors — they are only introduced as a convenience for mathematical
calculations — the relationship between Sr and the collection {Sj} is arbitrary; in particular
Sr may intersect the other hypersurfaces, or it could be identical to one of them. By means
of the unitary time development operators Tjr mapping Hr to the other Hilbert spaces we
define the Heisenberg operator
Pˆ
αj
j = TrjP
αj
j Tjr. (30)
corresponding to the projector P
αj
j . Heisenberg chain operators mapping Hr to itself are
then defined as a product of Heisenberg projectors (15), and the weights and consistency
conditions are expressed in terms of these chain operators using (16) and (17), with an
appropriate definition of the operator inner product 〈, 〉.
Defining 〈, 〉 in terms of the trace, as in (11), is only satisfactory if the trace exists, which
need not be the case, since Hr is infinite. There is no problem if all the histories we are
interested in are of the form (4) with Ψ0 a pure initial state or a projector onto a finite
subspace of H0. Alternatively, one can introduce a density operator ρ0 (with unit trace) on
H0, define its Heisenberg counterpart ρˆ = Tr0ρ0T0r as in (30), and replace the operator inner
product 〈, 〉 in (16) and (17) with
〈A,B〉ρ = Tr(ρˆA†B). (31)
(In this case it is best to regard ρˆ as a pre-probability; see Sec. 15.2 of [35].) Of course,
any other Hj could be used in place of H0, but physicists typically tend to employ an initial
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condition (we live in a thermodynamically irreversible world). Given a family of histories
satisfying the consistency conditions (17), its physical interpretation is precisely the same
as in the nonrelativistic case: one and only one history belonging to the family actually
occurs in any given situation. The probabilities of histories are determined by the weights
and whatever constitutes one’s information about the initial state or experimental setup;
see, e.g., Sec. 9.1 of [35].
Since histories with events on a finite set of spacelike hypersurfaces may seem odd to
a reader accustomed to the continuous time trajectories familiar in classical physics, the
following comments may be helpful. Just as in the nonrelativistic case — see the discussion
of refining a family in Sec. II C — it is always possible to introduce additional spacelike
hypersurfaces between (or before or after) those in the collection {Sj}, and extend histories
of the form (2), without changing their physical meaning, by introducing the trivial event I
on these additional hypersurfaces. This shows that defining histories on a finite collection
of hypersurfaces does not imply that the world ceases to exist at intermediate space-time
points, it simply means that these histories contain no information about what is happening
elsewhere than on these hypersurfaces. Think of being outside on a dark night during a
thunder storm, when flashes of lightening illuminate the landscape at certain times, but
nothing can be seen in the intervening intervals. In the nonrelativistic case one can, to be
sure, produce histories which are described by non-trivial (not equal to I) projectors at all
times, thus “filling in the gaps” in (2); one method of doing this is discussed in Sec. 11.7
of [35]. However, different ways of filling the gaps lead to incompatible families, and since
there is no limit to the number of times which enter a discrete history of the form (2), there
is really no need to fill the gaps from the point of view of providing an adequate physical
description. The same comment applies in the relativistic case, at least for the purposes of
the present paper.
Just as in Sec. II, a family of histories satisfying the consistency conditions will be called
a consistent family or framework. A refinement F ′ of a framework F must include among its
hypersurfaces {S ′k} all the hypersurfaces associated with F , and on the latter the decomposi-
tion of the identity used in F ′ must be a refinement of the one used in F . In order for it to be
a framework, F ′ must satisfy the consistency conditions. Two frameworks F and G will be
said to be compatible provided they possess a common refinement which is itself a framework;
otherwise they are incompatible. This is the same definition employed in the nonrelativistic
case. The single framework rule is also the same as for nonrelativistic quantum theory:
quantum descriptions must always be constructed using a single framework. If two frame-
works are not identical but are compatible, a common description can be constructed using
their common refinement. However, descriptions corresponding to incompatible frameworks
cannot be combined.
III B Local regions and properties
For discussing macrolocality and quantum paradoxes we shall want to consider spacelike
regions Rj of finite extent, see Fig. 2(a), each consisting of one or else a small number of
connected pieces belonging to a spacelike hypersurface Sj, with each piece of “macroscopic”
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Figure 2: (a) Finite regions Rj , possibly consisting of more than one connected piece, be-
longing to infinite spacelike hypersurfaces. (b) An alternative way of embedding the same
finite regions in spacelike hypersurfaces.
size, much larger than a Compton wavelength, with “reasonable” (e.g., piecewise smooth)
boundaries — imagine a sphere or a cube. (Much of the following discussion is valid if
Rj is an infinite piece of Sj , but we shall be interested in cases in which it is finite.) By
making each Rj part of some Sj, with the collection {Sj} satisfying the conditions given
in Sec. III A, we ensure that it is possible to impose a well-defined time ordering on these
finite regions. One could also do this by working out a set of conditions applicable directly
to the collection {Rj}, but requiring that they be embeddable in a time ordered collection
of infinite hypersurfaces is a fairly simply and intuitive way to proceed.
The lowbrow way to think of a property Pj as local to or localized in Rj is to imagine
that the Hilbert space Hj associated with Sj is a tensor product Hrj⊗Hsj , with Hrj associated
with Rj and Hsj associated with the complement of Rj in Sj. Then suppose that on this
tensor product Pj is of the form P
r
j ⊗Isj , with Isj the identity on Hsj . Thus P rj , an operator on
Hrj , tells one something about the state of affairs inside Rj, while Isj is totally uninformative
about what is going on elsewhere. Note that the usual physicists’ convention allows the same
symbol Pj to represent P
r
j or P
r
j ⊗ Isj , without (much) risk of confusion, and we shall make
use of this liberty. The highbrow way of thinking about a localized property requires dealing
seriously with the microlocality problem, see Sec. I, and is outside the scope of the present
paper. If Rj can be embedded in two different spacelike hypersurfaces Sj and S
′
j , then the
same local event will be represented by two different projectors in the Hilbert spaces Hj
and H′j . We shall make the plausible assumption that these two projectors lead to one and
the same Heisenberg projector when mapped via (30) to the reference space Hr using the
appropriate time development operators Trj and T
′
rj .
Next we make the very important assumption that the dynamics embodied in the col-
lection of unitary time transformations Tjk is local in the sense that whenever Rj and Rk
are two regions which are spacelike separated (i.e., each point in Rj is at a positive spacelike
separation from each point in Rk), and Pj and Qk are projectors referring to physical events
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(or properties) in Rj and Rk, respectively, the corresponding Heisenberg operators commute:
PˆjQˆk = QˆkPˆj. (32)
This is often referred to as the principle of causality [46]. For our analysis it has the important
consequence that in cases in which more than one time ordering is possible for a collection
of regions {Rj}, because some of the regions are spacelike with respect to each other — for
example, R0 and R1 in Fig. 2 — these different time orderings will give rise to the same chain
operators (15), since the corresponding Heisenberg operators commute with each other.
Suppose that Rj consists of two or more disconnected subregions, e.g., R3 in Fig. 2(a). We
shall say that a projector Pj which is local to Rj is in addition localized with respect to these
subregions if it is a product of projectors, one (possibly the identity) for each subregion,
i.e., local to this subregion. Otherwise Pj is entangled with respect to these subregions.
The distinction is important, because, as we shall see later, one may wish to embed the
subregions in distinct nonintersecting hypersurfaces, as in Fig. 2(b), which are part of a
time-ordered collection. If Pj is localized, this construction causes no difficulty, because each
of the factors making up Pj is itself a local projector on the corresponding subregion, and the
physical interpretation of this projector does not depend on the hypersurface in which the
subregion is embedded. But if Pj is entangled, one cannot change the embedding by placing
the subregions (at least those among which Pj is entangled) in distinct hypersurfaces without
violating the condition, fundamental to our construction of relativistic histories, that each
projector representing a single event in a history be associated with a particular hypersurface
in a time-ordered collection of such surfaces. This difference between localized and entangled
projectors will play a significant role in the later discussion of quantum paradoxes.
III C Lorentz invariance
Lorentz invariance requires that the “laws of physics” be the same in every Lorentz frame. In
the preceding analysis the whole discussion has been carried out for a single Lorentz frame,
let us call it L. What should we expect if we use a different Lorentz frame L′, thought of as
a different choice for a coordinate system?
Each spacelike hypersurface Sj should be thought of as consisting of a definite collection
of space-time points which is unchanged when the new coordinate system L′ is adopted.
All that happens is that the quartet of numbers r = (t, x, y, z) representing a particular
space-time point is replaced by a new quartet r′ = (t′, x′, y′, z′). The symbol S ′j can be
used to denote the same collection of space-time points as Sj , but relabeled using the new
coordinates. If in L the hypersurface Sj is specified by an equation
t = τj(x, y, z), (33)
then in L′ the same hypersurface, denoted by S ′j, will be specified in the same manner, by
setting t′ equal to a different function τ ′j(x
′, y′, z′).
Let us assume that there are well-defined rules based upon the function τ for assigning a
Hilbert Hj to the surface Sj, and that these rules do not depend upon the Lorentz frame. Of
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course they will assign a different Hilbert space H′j to S ′j because τ ′ is not the same function
as τ . However, we can expect that H′j is related to Hj by a unitary map (bijective isometry)
Lj which carries some |ψ〉 in Hj onto a |ψ′〉 in H′j representing the same physical property.
Next assume that the unitary time transformation Tjk mapping Sk to Sj is determined
in a unique way by the two functions τj and τk, by rules which do not depend upon the
Lorentz frame once these functions are given. In the same way, T ′jk mapping S
′
k to S
′
j will
be determined by the functions τ ′j and τ
′
k. The Lorentz invariance of the dynamics is then
expressed by the requirement
T ′jk = LjTjkL
†
k (34)
for every pair j and k.
A history embodying the same physical events as in (2) will when expressed using the
Hilbert spaces H′j be of the form
Y ′
α
= P ′0
α0 ⊙ P ′1α1 ⊙ P ′2α2 ⊙ · · · ⊙ P ′fαf , (35)
with
P ′j
αj = LjP
αj
j L
†
j . (36)
It is then easy to show that the weights calculated using the chain operators (15) for such
histories in L′ are the same as their counterparts in L, and the consistency conditions (17)
hold in L′ if and only if they hold in L, using the operator inner product defined in (11),
or the one in (31), provided ρˆ is replaced by a suitable ρˆ′. Thus the descriptions in the two
Lorentz frames are physically equivalent to each other. A final point has to do with locality
and the condition (32) for Heisenberg operators associated with regions which are spacelike
separated from each other. All one needs to note is that regions which are spacelike separated
in one Lorentz frame are also spacelike separated in any other, and the transformation rules
in (36) ensure that PˆjQˆk is identical to QˆkPˆj if and only if Pˆ
′
jQˆ
′
k is the same as Qˆ
′
kPˆ
′
j .
To be sure, all the difficulties of Lorentz invariance have been “buried” in the assumption
that appropriate transformations Lj exist, and that the unitary time transformations satisfy
(34), whatever inertial frame L′ is employed. This, however, is as it should be: the present
paper is not devoted to the difficult task of constructing a Lorentz-invariant relativistic
theory. Instead, its purpose is to show how various quantum paradoxes are to be resolved,
by the appropriate use of histories, within the framework of such a theory, assuming it exists.
IV Wave Function Collapse
IV A Introduction
Imagine a particle emitted in a nuclear decay, moving outwards as a spherical wave packet.
When detected by a detector some distance away, its wave function, according to textbook
quantum theory, collapses instantaneously to zero everywhere outside the detector, since
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that is where the particle is now located. This collapse helps explain why the particle
cannot be detected later by a second detector located further from the original decay. But
the notion of such a collapse has troubled many physicists ever since the earliest days of
quantum theory [47]. It is troubling because, among other things, what is instantaneous in
one Lorentz frame is not instantaneous in another, and therefore in some Lorentz frames
the collapse will travel faster than the speed of light, or even backwards in time, placing
the effect earlier than the cause. In addition, if after a suitable time the detector has not
detected the particle, the probability increases that the particle will be detected by another
detector located further away, unless this second detector is shadowed by the first, so even
nondetection can alter (collapse?) the particle’s wave function. (This has led to the rather
confusing idea of an “interaction-free” measurement; see [49] and pp. 495f of [48].)
A S B
|φa〉 |φb〉
Figure 3: Wave packets representing a single particle, moving left and right from a source S
towards detectors A and B.
In order to focus on essentials and simplify the discussion of how a histories approach
resolves (or tames) these problems, it is useful to consider the analogous situation in one
spatial dimension, as shown in Fig. 3, where the wave function of the particle (one particle,
not two!) is given by a linear superposition
|ψ(t)〉 = (|φa(t)〉+ |φb(t)〉)/√2 (37)
of two wave packets moving outwards from a central source S towards two detectors A and B,
with A closer to S than B. If A detects the particle, then at that instant of time (according
to the collapse idea) the b part of the wave packet in (37) vanishes, whereas if A does not
detect the particle, the superposition (37) is to be instantly replaced by |φb(t)〉. Figure 3 is
only schematic; we are interested in situations in which the distances separating source and
detectors are very much larger than the widths of the wave packets, perhaps large enough
that it takes light a significant amount of time to travel from S to A or B [50].
IV B Without detectors
As in Sec. II D, it is helpful to begin our analysis by considering a situation in which there are
no detectors present. The dashed lines in Fig. 4(a) represent the centers of the wave packets
|φa(t)〉 and |φb(t)〉 in the Lorentz frame L where their velocities are equal and opposite.
Unitary time development then corresponds to a family F0 with support (as defined in
Sec. II D) consisting of the single history
F0: ψ(t0)⊙ ψ(t1)⊙ ψ(t2)⊙ · · · , (38)
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Figure 4: (a) Wave packet trajectories (dashed) and constant t lines in the L space-time
diagram. (b) Additional constant t′ lines for Lorentz frame L′. (c) Alternative hypersurfaces
replacing the constant t lines.
where ψ(t) is the projector onto |ψ(t)〉. To discuss the location of the particle, and in
particular whether it is to the left or to the right of the source, we introduce at time tj a
decomposition of the identity
Ij =
∑
λj
P
λj
j , (39)
where the projectors P
λj
j project onto nonoverlapping intervals of the x axis chosen so that
they are large in comparison to the widths of the individual wave packets φa and φb, but
small compared to the macroscopic length scales in Fig. 4. They are also chosen so that
at each time tj both φa(tj) and φb(tj) are well inside one of the intervals and not on the
boundary between two of them. This way the family
F1: ψ(t0)⊙ {P λ11 } ⊙ {P λ22 } ⊙ {P λ33 } ⊙ · · · (40)
will be consistent, and its support contains just two histories,
F1: ψ(t0)⊙
{
P a11 ⊙P a22 ⊙P a32 ⊙· · · ,
P b11 ⊙P b22 ⊙P b32 ⊙· · · ,
(41)
with equal weight. The first history says that as time increases the particle is in a series of
intervals a1, a2, . . . falling along the dashed line a in Fig. 4(a), and the second that it is in
a series of intervals falling along b. Thus they are coarse-grained quantum descriptions that
approximate classical trajectories. The two histories are mutually exclusive possibilities:
either the first occurs, so the particle follows trajectory a, or the second, so the particle
follows b. The particle cannot follow both trajectories, or hop from one to the other. If at
time t2 it is, say, in the interval a2, then earlier it was in a1, and later it will be in a3.
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The families F0 and F1 are incompatible, because P ajj and P bjj do not commute with
ψ(tj), as follows from (37) and
P
aj
j |ψ(tj)〉 = |φa(tj)〉/
√
2, P
bj
j |ψ(tj)〉 = |φb(tj)〉/
√
2. (42)
To suppose that at tj the particle is in the physical state ψ(tj) and that it is located in one
of the two intervals P
aj
j or P
bj
j is as meaningless as saying that a spin-half particle is in the
state Sz = +1/2, and at the same time ascribing to it values of Sx.
Next consider a family F2 with support consisting of
F2: ψ(t0)⊙ ψ(t1)⊙
{
P a22 ⊙P a33 ⊙· · · ,
P b22 ⊙P b33 ⊙· · · .
(43)
Until t1 the particle is in a nonlocal superposition, and thereafter it either follows the (coarse-
grained) a trajectory or the b trajectory, two mutually exclusive possibilities, with probability
1/2. One could, if one wants to, say that the initial description in terms of ψ(t) “collapses”
between t1 and t2 onto another sort of description in which the particle follows one of
two distinct trajectories. However, one should not think of this “collapse” as a physical
process. Instead it is the analog of a description of a spin-half particle in terms of Sz
followed at a later time in terms of Sx, as in (22). The families F0, F1, and F2 are mutually
incompatible in much the same way as their counterparts in Sec. II D. Each is a valid way
of describing the quantum particle, and there is no “law of nature” that specifies that one
of them is the “correct” description. However, there is a law of mathematics which prevents
one from combining them, since there is no way of representing in the quantum Hilbert space
a combination of events corresponding to noncommuting projectors.
There are always many incompatible ways of describing a quantum system, and the
choice among them depends on what one wants to discuss. The use of F2 makes it possible
to ascribe at time t1 a relative phase to the sum of the wave packets making up |ψ〉, in
the sense that a + sign occurs rather than a − sign on the right side of (37), but does not
allow one to assign a position to the particle, even to the extent of saying that it is to the
right or to the left of the source S. Assigning a coarse-grained position at this time requires
that one use F1, or something like it, in which case the relative phase of the wave packets
becomes a meaningless concept. Incidentally, once the “split” has occurred in the family F2
the histories cannot be “joined” at a later time: replacing P a33 and P
b3
3 in (43) with ψ(t3)
violates the consistency conditions, and the same comment applies to F1. In these respects
the situation is analogous to that of the spin-half particle considered in Sec. II D.
IV C Different Lorentz frames
Consider a Lorentz frame L′ moving with respect to the frame L we have employed thus far,
with constant-time surfaces shown in Fig. 4(b) superimposed on the space-time diagram of
(a). Let
|ψ′(t′)〉 = (|φ′a(t′)〉+ |φ′b(t′)〉)/√2 (44)
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represent the wave function as it develops unitarily in time in the new Hilbert space. The
obvious analogs F ′0, F ′1, and F ′2 of the families considered previously can be obtained by
adding primes to the appropriate symbols in (38), (41), and (43), and the remarks made
above about the physical interpretations of the Fj apply equally to the F ′j.
The three families F ′0, F ′1 and F ′2 are not only incompatible with one another, each is
also incompatible with each of the three families F0, F1, and F2, because the constant-time
hyperplanes of L′ intersect those of L, and there is no way of placing them in a time-ordered
sequence. However, the incompatibility of F1 and F ′1 is only apparent, and can be removed
by employing the “trick” shown in Fig. 4(c). Here the finite regions, shown with heavy lines,
where the particle can be located at t1 and t2 in F1 have been embedded into an alternative
set of hypersurfaces which do not intersect, and are thus compatible with, the hyperplanes
used in F ′1. This construction is possible, as indicated at the end of Sec. III B, provided
we are interested in properties which are localized in the separate subregions, rather than
entangled among them. In the family F1 we are concerned with local properties: whether
the particle is located in the a subregion or in the b subregion, rather than ψ(t1) and ψ(t2),
which occur in the unitary family F0, and are entangled between the a and the b subregions.
But does P a11 , whose physical interpretation is that “the particle is in the (small) interval
a1”, really represent a local property? There is a subtlety here, for in the lowbrow approach
outlined in Sec. III B a local property is represented by a projector on the Hilbert space of a
(macro)local region, times the identity on another Hilbert space for the rest of the universe.
In a Hilbert space of one-particle wave packets, P a11 is not of this form, because it tells us both
that the particle is in a1 and that it is not in some distant region; i.e., this projector provides
more than local information. The way to get around this is to employ a many-particle Hilbert
space, define P a11 to be the projector that tells us there is exactly one particle in a1, and use
the initial state ψ(t0) to specify that the universe contains only one particle, as well as giving
the wave packet for this one particle. In a history whose initial state is ψ(t0), and given a
dynamical law that the particle cannot disappear or other particles appear, the event P a11
will allow us to infer that the particle is in a1 and therefore not elsewhere, even though the
projector P a11 by itself provides only local information. The reader for whom this argument
is unnecessary should ignore it, while he who finds it inadequate is invited to construct a
better version.
We conclude that in terms of their actual physical contents, F1 and F ′1 are compatible,
with a common refinement, call it F∗1 , that uses the time ordering associated with the
collection of hypersurfaces in Fig. 4(c). The support of F∗1 again consists of two histories,
one with the particle following trajectory a in a coarse-grained sense, described sometimes
by an L and sometimes by an L′ projector, and the other following trajectory b in a similar
fashion. Aside from the subtleties associated with coarse graining, in both space and time,
the trajectories agree with the picture provided by classical physics, even though they arise
from a fully quantum-mechanical description.
On the other hand, the trick just discussed cannot be used in order to combine F1 with
F ′2. While one can introduce a common set of hypersurfaces as in Fig. 4(c), the common
refinement will not satisfy the consistency conditions. The trouble is that the particle can
be localized on the b trajectory at t1 in F1, and this precedes (in the time ordering of the
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hypersurfaces) the entangled state between a and b at t′1 in F ′2. As noted above, trying to
“uncollapse” a quantum description in this manner violates the consistency requirements.
It is like introducing an Sz description into (21) after an Sx description has appeared. In
addition, one cannot combine F2 with F ′2, for in this case the events at t1 in the former and
at t′1 in the latter are both entangled, so the collection of hypersurfaces in Fig. 4(c) is no
longer of any use. (It is possible, see the comments near the beginning of Sec. VII A, that
some consistent generalization of the rules given in Sec. III might allow one to construct a
common refinement in this case, but possible extensions of these rules fall outside the scope
of the present paper.)
IV D Detectors
Most of the tools required to resolve (or tame) the paradox of wave function collapse are now
in hand; all that remains is to introduce measurements. This we do using a fully quantum-
mechanical description of the two particle detectors shown in Fig. 3. Let their states when
ready to detect a particle be denoted by |A(t)〉 and |B(t)〉, respectively, and suppose that the
detection event for the particle when represented by wave packet |φa〉 is given by a unitary
time development
|φa〉|A〉 → |A∗〉. (45)
Here |A∗〉 is a state in which this detector has detected the particle, as indicated by the
position of a large pointer, or some other macroscopic change that clearly distinguishes it
from the untriggered or ready state |A〉. The time arguments have been omitted in (45); one
should think of the left side as at a time t′ before the particle interacts with the detector,
while the right side as at a time t′′ after the interaction, when the particle is trapped inside
the detector. If, on the other hand, the particle is represented by wave packet |φb〉, it will
not interact with detector A, and the counterpart of (45) is
|φb〉|A〉 → |φb〉|A〉. (46)
The analogous expressions for the B detector are:
|φa〉|B〉 → |φa〉|B〉, |φb〉|B〉 → |B∗〉. (47)
With both detectors initially in the ready state, the overall unitary time development
corresponding to the space-time diagram in Fig. 5(a) is represented by a family with support
G0: Ψ0 ⊙Ψ1 ⊙Ψ2 ⊙Ψ3 ⊙ · · · , (48)
where
|Ψ0〉 = |ψ(t0)〉|A〉|B〉
|Ψ1〉 = |ψ(t1)〉|A〉|B〉
|Ψ2〉 =
(|A∗〉+ |φb(t2)|A〉)|B〉/√2
|Ψ3〉 =
(|A∗〉|B〉+ |A〉|B∗〉)/√2, (49)
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Figure 5: (a) Wave packet trajectories (sloping dashed lines) and detector trajectories (ver-
tical dashed lines) in the L space-time diagram. (b) Additional constant t′ lines for Lorentz
frame L′.
and time arguments have again been omitted from the detector states. Note that since the
detectors are macroscopic objects, both |Ψ2〉 and |Ψ3〉 are examples of MQS states; see (26)
and the comments following it.
The family G1 with support
G1: Ψ0 ⊙
{
P a11 AB⊙A∗B⊙A∗B⊙· · ·
P b11 AB ⊙ AB ⊙AB∗⊙· · ·
(50)
is analogous to F1 in Sec. IV B. In the first history the particle follows the a trajectory
and is detected by A, while the B detector is unaffected. In the second history it is the
A detector that remains in its ready state while the particle moves along trajectory b and
triggers B. Note, in particular, that from the fact that detector A triggers one can conclude
that the particle was earlier moving towards this detector, rather than towards B, while if
at t2 detector A has not detected the particle, one can infer that the particle is (and was)
moving towards detector B, and will later be detected by B. Such inferences are not at all
mysterious, and make no reference to wave function collapse. Instead, they are consequences
of the fact that the two histories in (50) are the only two possibilities; all others have zero
probability. There are, to be sure, many other frameworks that can be used to describe this
situation in quantum terms, but any framework that contains the events needed to draw the
conclusions stated above will assign them the same probabilities as G1; see Sec. 16.3 of [35].
Another family G2 with support
G2: Ψ0 ⊙ ψ(t1)AB ⊙
{
A∗B ⊙A∗B⊙· · ·
φb(t2)AB⊙AB∗⊙· · ·
(51)
is analogous to F2 in Sec. IV B in that the particle remains in a superposition state ψ at time
t1, whereas at t2 there has been a “collapse” into two possibilities: either the particle has
been detected by A, the first history, or, in the second history, it has not been detected by A
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and is still on its way to towards B, which will have detected it by t3. (In the second history
one could use the interval projector P b22 at time t2 in place of the wave packet projector
φb(t2); for our purposes it makes no difference.) Note that just as the “collapse” in F2 is
not a physical process, but represents a change in the type of description being employed, so
also in G2 it is not something which is brought about by some “law of nature”, as is evident
from the fact that G0 and G1 are equally good descriptions, and in neither of them does
interaction with a measuring apparatus produce a corresponding “collapse.”
Introducing another description based on constant time (hyper)surfaces in a second
Lorentz frame L′, Fig. 5(b), leads to no new principles beyond those already discussed
in Sec. IV C. There is a formal incompatibility between descriptions based upon constant
t and constant t′ hyperplanes, but if one is concerned with local properties it is possible to
adopt a common refinement in which the particle either moves along the a trajectory to be
detected by A, or along the b trajectory to be detected by B, and can be seen to do so using
either L or L′ projectors, provided that these descriptions are interleaved and one does not
try and impose them simultaneously at the same (macro)point in space-time. Note, in par-
ticular, that if one is using such a local quantum description, the fact that in L′ the particle
can reach B earlier than it can reach A, the reverse from L, is no more paradoxical than in
classical relativistic physics. It is only if one insists upon employing a collapse picture using
G2, (51), along with its counterpart G ′2 in L′, that difficulties arise. These two families are
incompatible according to the rules of Sec. III, and it makes no sense to ask which of them
is correct, or when it is that the collapse “really” occurs, etc.
IV E Summary
It is useful to summarize the lessons provided by the preceding analysis by restating its
conclusions as they apply to the situation which initiated our discussion: a particle moving
outwards in a spherical wave, which may later encounter a detector (or perhaps several de-
tectors). The spherical wave corresponds to unitary time development (solving Schro¨dinger’s
equation), and if unitary time development is applied to the full quantum system of particle
plus detector, the result will be an MQS state of a triggered and untriggered detector. While
this, the analog of G0 in (48), is a perfectly valid quantum description, it is not useful for
answering questions such as: Did the detector detect the particle? Where was the parti-
cle before it was detected? Posing these questions requires using projectors which do not
commute with the projector Ψ(t) on the state |Ψ(t)〉 resulting from unitary time evolution,
and hence they are meaningless within that framework. Instead, one must use a family of
stochastic histories in which at an appropriate time the detector has or has not detected
the particle, something analogous to G1 or G2 in (50) and (51). In families which are the
analogs of G1, the particle follows a coarse-grained trajectory, the quantum counterpart of a
“classical” description, moving in a straight line from the source of the decay until it reaches
(in some histories) or misses (in others) the detector. This is the type of description actu-
ally used by physicists when thinking about decays of unstable particles, especially when
designing equipment with collimators and detectors, or considering sources of undesirable
background (see, e.g., pp. 123f in [31]). Because the events in these families are local in
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a coarse-grained sense, relative to macroscopic length scales, their behavior under Lorentz
transformations is (essentially) the same as in classical relativistic physics.
Wave function collapse is never needed in order to produce physically-meaningful quan-
tum descriptions, since one can always assign probabilities within a consistent family or
framework using the Born rule and its consistent extension, and then use these to calculate
appropriate conditional probabilities. There are, to be sure, families of histories, the analogs
of G2, which can be thought of as exhibiting a “collapse”. While these are perfectly legiti-
mate quantum descriptions, the collapse can occur in the absence as well as in the presence
of a measurement, and represents a change in the type of quantum description employed,
not some sort of physical process. It is analogous to the physicist’s choice to describe an iso-
lated spin-half particle during a certain time interval using Sz, and during a subsequent time
interval using Sx, even though the unitary time development is trivial; see the comments
following (21).
V EPR Paradox
V A Introduction
The celebrated Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen [13] or EPR paradox is usually discussed nowadays
using the formulation introduced by Bohm [51] in which two spin-half particles a and b
prepared in a spin-singlet state
|s0〉 =
(|z+a 〉|z−b 〉 − |z−a 〉|z+b 〉)/√2, (52)
where |z+a 〉 is the state Saz = +1/2 of particle a, etc., fly apart from each other, and the spin of
one of the particles is later measured. If Saz is measured and the outcome is +1/2, this means
that Sbz = −1/2 for particle b, while an outcome of −1/2 implies that Sbz = +1/2. Similarly,
if Sax is measured, then Sbx will have the opposite value: Sbx = −Sax. The paradox is that
one seems able to assign a value to either Sbz or to Sbx depending upon which measurement
is carried out on particle a, and since the measurement should not influence particle b, this
seems to mean that both Sbz and Sbx have well-defined values, contrary to the principles of
quantum theory.
Neither the original EPR formulation nor that of Bohm make use of relativistic quantum
theory. But the paradox becomes a bit sharper in a relativistic context, for particles a and
b could be spacelike separated when a measurement is made on a, so that any influence
on b would seem contrary to the principles of relativity theory. In addition, if the paradox
is formulated in terms of wave function collapse — the spin state |s0〉 changes instantly
to either |z+a 〉|z−b 〉 or |z−a 〉|z+b 〉 when Saz is measured — one encounters the same problem
noted in Sec. IV A: the collapse is not Lorentz invariant, as well as (or because of) being
instantaneous between spacelike separated points.
Rather than a single measurement on particle a, one can imagine separate spin measure-
ments on a and b, and if they are of the same component, say Sz, then they will always give
opposite results, Sbz = −Saz . It is worth emphasizing that this sort of correlation, even when
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the measurements are carried out in spacelike separated regions, is not in itself paradoxical,
as can be seen from a simple classical example. A pair of opaque envelopes is prepared, one
containing a red and the other a green slip of paper. One envelope, chosen at random, is
taken by astronaut Alice on a voyage to Mars, while the other remains behind on the desk
of Bob at mission control. By opening her envelope and observing (“measuring”) the color
of the slip of paper, Alice at once knows the color of the slip of paper in Bob’s envelope, and
thus the color that Bob will observe (or perhaps has already observed) when he opens it,
even if that event occurs at a spacelike separation. As with every classical analogy, this one
is not adequate for illustrating all aspects of the quantum situation, but it does help clarify
what is and is not specific to quantum theory.
V B Without measurements
As in Sec. IV, we shall first analyze what happens in the absence of measurements, assuming
the two-particle wave function satisfying Schro¨dinger’s equation is given at time t by
|ψ(t)〉 = |ω(t)〉|s0〉, |ω(t)〉 = |φa(t)〉|φb(t)〉, (53)
where |φa(t)〉 and |φb(t)〉 are wave packets of the sort shown in Fig. 3, except that now
they refer to two distinct (and distinguishable) particles. Their trajectories in a space-time
diagram are shown by the dashed lines in Fig. 4, where once again we assume that the
distances are macroscopic, much larger than the microscopic extent of a wave packet. Since
we are interested in the spins rather than the positions of the particles, it is convenient to
ignore the latter, and think of
F0: ψ0 ⊙ s0 ⊙ s0 ⊙ · · · , (54)
as a unitary history, with ψ0 the projector on the initial state |ψ(t0)〉 and s0 on the spin
singlet state |s0〉. In this family nothing can be said about any component of the spin angular
momentum of particle a or of particle b, since the projectors for individual spin states, such
as |z+a 〉, do not commute with s0.
More information about properties of individual spins is provided by the family
F1: ψ0 ⊙
{
z+a z
−
b ⊙ z+a z−b ⊙ · · · ,
z−a z
+
b ⊙ z−a z+b ⊙ · · · ,
(55)
where each history occurs with probability 1/2. The physical interpretation is straightfor-
ward: in the first history, particle a has Saz = +1/2 and particle b has Sbz = −1/2 at all
times later than t0, whereas in the second history Saz = −1/2 and Sbz = +1/2. In either
case the spins are opposite, Sbz = −Saz, in the same way as the colors of the slips of paper
in the envelopes belonging to Alice and Bob.
Still another consistent family
F2: ψ0 ⊙ s0 ⊙
{
z+a z
−
b ⊙ z+a z−b ⊙ · · ·
z−a z
+
b ⊙ z−a z+b ⊙ · · · ,
(56)
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is analogous to F2 in Sec. IV B: up to t1 the spins are in the entangled singlet state, but
thereafter they “collapse” into states in which each particle has a well-defined value of Sz. Of
course this collapse, just like those discussed in Secs. II D and IV B, has nothing to do with
any physical process, and instead reflects a change in the choice of basis in which to describe
the spins of the two particles; the comments following (43) apply equally in the present
case. The frameworks F0, F1, and F2 are mutually incompatible. In addition, consistency
conditions mean that one cannot “uncollapse” the histories in F2 (or in F1) by replacing
the Sz projectors at, say, t3 with s0; again, the situation is analogous to that discussed in
Sec. IV B.
There is nothing special about the z direction. The family
F3: ψ0 ⊙
{
x+a x
−
b ⊙ x+a x−b ⊙ · · ·
x−a x
+
b ⊙ x−a x+b ⊙ · · · ,
(57)
is as good a quantum description as F1, and replacing z by x everywhere in (56) results
in yet another consistent family. All of the frameworks discussed thus far are mutually
incompatible, which does not mean that using one of them to construct a correct quantum
description of the particle’s time evolution makes the others false, or that one must invoke
some hitherto unknown law of nature to decide which framework is “correct.” Instead,
think of each one as describing a somewhat different “aspect” of the time development
of the quantum system, viewing it from a somewhat different perspective, and thus each
framework allows one to answer a different set of physically sensible questions about the
system. How are the values of Sax and Sbx related to each other at some particular time?
This can only be answered by employing a framework in which the relevant projectors occur
at the time of interest; e.g., F3 must be used rather than F1.
One does not have to use the same component of spin angular momentum for particles
a and b. In the framework
F4: ψ0 ⊙


z+a x
+
b ⊙ z+a x+b ⊙ · · · ,
z+a x
−
b ⊙ z+a x−b ⊙ · · · ,
z−a x
+
b ⊙ z−a x+b ⊙ · · · ,
z−a x
−
b ⊙ z−a x−b ⊙ · · ·
(58)
the four histories occur with equal probability, and there is no correlation between Saz and
Sbx. For additional comments on this and other examples, see Sec. 23.3 of [35].
V C Measurements
The spin measuring devices introduced in Sec. II D can also be employed in the present con-
text if supplied with a subscript to indicate which particle is being measured. For example,
the device to measure Saz has an initial state |Za〉, and we assume that the unitary time
development when it interacts with particle a has the form
|z+a 〉|Za〉 → |z+a 〉|Z+a 〉, |z−a 〉|Za〉 → |z−a 〉|Z−a 〉. (59)
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For an Sax measurement replace Z with X and z with x. Nondestructive measurements are
not essential, but they simplify drawing connections with traditional discussions using wave
function collapse.
If we assume world lines as in Fig. 5(a), but with the B detector eliminated, unitary time
development starting with an initial state
|Ψ0〉 = |Ψ(t0)〉 = |ω(t0)〉|s0〉|Za〉, (60)
in which the detector is ready to measure Saz, results in a succession of states
|Ψ(t1)〉 = |ω(t1)〉|s0〉|Za〉,
|Ψ(t2)〉 = |ω(t2)〉
(|z+a 〉|z−b 〉|Z+a 〉 − |z−a 〉|z+b 〉|Z−a 〉)/√2, (61)
and so forth; for t3 and all later times the spin and detector states are the same as for |Ψ(t2)〉.
Now |Ψ(t2)〉 is an MQS state, so that the unitary family that contains it, the analog
of G0 in (48), cannot be used to discuss the outcomes of measurements. Instead, we need
something like
G1: Ψ0 ⊙
{
z+a z
−
b Za ⊙ z+a z−b Z+a ⊙ z+a z−b Z+a ⊙ · · · ,
z−a z
+
b Za ⊙ z−a z+b Z−a ⊙ z−a z+b Z−a ⊙ · · · ,
(62)
where the two histories occur with equal probability. In the first of these Saz = +1/2 and
Sbz = −1/2 at times t1 and later, and the measurement outcome is Z+a at times t2 and
later, as one would expect, while in the other history + and − are interchanged. This family
corresponds to the classical analogy introduced in Sec. V A, where astronaut Alice’s opening
the envelope and seeing a red (or green) slip of paper reveals a prior state of affairs, and
enables her to conclude that the one in Bob’s envelope is of the opposite color. Of course,
this is not surprising given our earlier discussion of the family G1 in Sec. II D and G1 in
Sec. IV D.
One can construct a family G2, the analog of (51), in which the spin state in both histories
is |s0〉 at time t1 and the “collapse” occurs in the same time step as the measurement:
G2: Ψ0 ⊙ s0Za ⊙
{
z+a z
−
b Z
+
a ⊙ z+a z−b Z+a ⊙, · · · ,
z−a z
+
b Z
−
a ⊙ z−a z+b Z−a ⊙ . · · · ,
(63)
An equally good family is
G4: Ψ0 ⊙ s0Za ⊙


z+a x
+
b Z
+
a ⊙ z+a x+b Z+a ⊙· · · ,
z+a x
−
b Z
+
a ⊙ z+a x−b Z+a ⊙· · · ,
z−a x
+
b Z
−
a ⊙ z−a x+b Z−a ⊙· · · ,
z−a x
−
b Z
−
a ⊙ z−a x−b Z−a ⊙· · · ,
(64)
the measurement counterpart of F4, where the collapse occurs at the same time, but now
the properties of particle b are uncorrelated with those of particle a. The existence of
frameworks such as G1 and G4 as alternatives to G2 helps prevent one from drawing the
erroneous conclusion that a measurement carried out on particle a has some mysterious
long-range influence on particle b.
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V D Different Lorentz frames
Consider a Lorenz frame L′ moving with respect to the frame L we have used up till now,
with constant time (t′) surfaces as shown in Fig. 4(b). Frameworks F ′j analogous to the Fj
of Sec. V B can be defined by introducing primes on the appropriate symbols in (53) to (58),
just as in Sec. IV C, and all comments made above on the physical interpretation of these
families apply equally to these new descriptions. As in Sec. IV C, each F ′k is incompatible
with each Fj according to the rules of Sec. III A, but in the case of F ′1 and F1, which refer to
local properties, one can use the “trick” in Fig. 4(c) in order to produce a common refinement
which includes the events of both frameworks for all tj and t
′
j with j > 0, with either ψ0 or
ψ′0 (choose one or the other) as the initial state. That is, the relative time ordering of events
with spacelike separation is of no concern provided they are, indeed, spacelike separated and
not represented by entangled projectors, such as s0.
There is, however, a complication not present in the earlier discussion in Sec. IV C,
where we were only concerned with the presence or absence of a particle in some region
of space. Here we are (at least potentially) interested in different properties, always of the
same particle, represented by noncommuting projectors, such as Saz and Sax. Suppose, for
example, we are interested in intercalating into the two histories in F1 in (55) at some time
between t1 and t2 a (local) property of particle a. If this is an L event, in the sense of
one defined using a projector on a hyperplane which is at a constant time in L, then it
must satisfy the consistency conditions; in particular, if it is a projector onto a spin state
of particle a, it must be either z+a or z
−
a . If, instead, we intercalate an L′ event, then it,
too, must satisfy the consistency conditions. In either case these are determined, see (17),
by modified Heisenberg chain operators in which the additional event is represented by its
Heisenberg projector at an appropriate point in the defining product (15). That is to say,
there are restrictions on which L′ properties can be consistently incorporated into an L
history, but they are of precisely the same form governing the addition of L events to that
history. While relativity theory adds technical complications, the basic rules for consistency
are exactly the same as in nonrelativistic quantum theory.
When one is interested in nonlocal properties represented by projectors on entangled
states between particles a and b, then, as noted in Sec. IV C, the “trick” of introducing
new hypersurfaces, Fig. 4(c), will not work, and one must pay attention to the rules of
Sec. III A in order to avoid a situation in which one entangled state in L′ “occurs” both
before (for particle a) and after (for particle b) another (entangled or product) state in L.
It is meaningless to combine two such descriptions, in the precise sense that the theory
as formulated in Sec. III cannot assign a meaning to the combination, even though the
individual events are themselves parts of sensible quantum descriptions.
Including measuring apparatus in the discussion leads to nothing new beyond what has
already been noted at the end of Sec. IV D. In particular, if a measurement outcome is being
used to infer a property of some particle in a localized region, such an inference is possible
whether or not the particle is moving relative to the measuring apparatus. Of course, if one
is interested in a property of the particle in its own rest frame, this must be appropriately
related to the frame in which the calculation is carried out. Such transformations, and their
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analogs in classical relativistic physics, are not trivial, but these are technical issues not
directly connected with the paradoxes associated with wave function collapse. The latter
are best disposed of by abandoning the notion of collapse, at least as some sort of physical
process, and instead using appropriate conditional probabilities based upon histories.
VI Hardy’s Paradox
VI A Statement of the paradox
Hardy’s paradox [21] resembles the EPR paradox in that it involves two well-separated parti-
cles in an entangled state. However, it is more striking in that certain assumptions, including
Lorentz invariance, seem to lead to a contradiction: something is shown to be true that is
known to be false. As well as the relativistic paradox discussed here, Hardy’s original paper
contains a slightly different paradox whose discussion requires the use of counterfactuals,
and for that reason lies outside the scope of the present paper. Our exposition differs in
some unimportant ways from Hardy’s original, and makes use of the nonrelativistic analysis
in Ch. 25 of [35] (which also discusses the counterfactual paradox).
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Figure 6: Apparatus for Hardy’s paradox; see text.
Imagine a source S, Fig. 6, that simultaneously emits two particles a and b into the arms
of two interferometers, in an initial state
|ψ0〉 =
(|cc¯〉+ |cd¯〉+ |dc¯〉)/√3, (65)
where |cc¯〉 denotes a state in which particle a is moving through the c arm of its interferometer
on the left side of the figure, and b is moving through the c¯ arm of the interferometer on the
right. Note that (65) has no |dd¯〉 term, so it is never the case that a is in the d arm at the
same time that b is in the d¯ arm.
The two beam splitters give rise to unitary time transformations
|c〉 → (|e〉+ |f〉)/√2, |d〉 → (−|e〉+ |f〉)/√2, (66)
|c¯〉 → (|e¯〉+ |f¯〉)/√2, |d¯〉 → (−|e¯〉+ |f¯〉)/√2, (67)
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Figure 7: Space-time diagram for Hardy’s paradox. The open circles represent the points
where the particles pass through the beam splitters, the solid circles at t2 (in L) represent
measurements which in L′ and L′′ are simultaneous with the corresponding points at t1. In
(b) these points are on nonintersecting hypersurfaces.
where for convenience we have chosen real phases (unlike [21]). Unitary time development
results in a state
|ψ2〉 =
(−|ee¯〉+ |ef¯〉+ |f e¯〉+ 3|f f¯〉)/√12, (68)
at a time t2, Fig. 7(a), when both particles have passed through the beam splitters. Note that
|ee¯〉 occurs with a finite amplitude, implying that a and b will be simultaneously detected
by E and E¯ with a probability of 1/12.
If the interferometers are sufficiently large there will be a Lorentz frame L′ in which
particle b is detected by E¯ or F¯ before particle a has reached the beam splitter on the left.
It is then plausible that just before detection occurs at the time t′1 in L′, see Fig. 7(a), the
wave function for the two particles is obtained by applying (67) but not (66) to (65), with
the result
|ψ′1〉 =
(
2|c′f¯ ′〉+ |d′f¯ ′〉+ |d′e¯′〉)/√6, (69)
where the primes indicate wave packets at constant time in L′. From this one can infer (e.g.,
by collapsing |ψ′1〉 to |d′e¯′〉) that if b is detected by E¯, then at t′1 particle a is in the d arm of
its interferometer. Similarly, there will be a Lorentz frame L′′ in which a is detected by E
or F before b reaches its beam splitter, and the counterpart of (69) is
|ψ′′1〉 =
(
2|f ′′c¯′′〉+ |f ′′d¯′′〉+ |e′′d¯′′〉)/√6. (70)
From this it follows that if particle a is detected by E, then at t′′1 particle b is in the d¯ arm
of its interferometer.
Next assume that the presence of particle a in arm d at a point on its trajectory indicated
by d1 in Fig. 7(a) does not depend upon whether one describes it using L or L′ or L′′, and
that there is a similar invariance for particle b relative to arm d¯, and for which of two
detectors has detected a particle. Hardy calls this assumption the Lorentz invariance of
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elements of reality, and it seems physically plausible, especially if one thinks of extremely
large interferometers, so that the different Lorentz frames can be moving rather slowly with
respect to each other. Assuming Lorentz invariance of this form, the inferences based on
(69) and (70) can be transferred to the Lorentz frame L, and one arrives at the disquieting
conclusion that in those cases (occurring with probability 1/12) in which a and b are are
simultaneously (in L) detected in E and E¯ at time t2, these particles were earlier, at t1, in
the d and d¯ arms of their respective interferometers. But this conclusion is inconsistent with
the initial state (65), since, as noted previously, it lacks a |dd¯〉 component.
VI B Resolution of the paradox
It is helpful to analyze the logical structure of the argument leading to the paradox in a bit
more detail. Using the space-time “points” (regions small compared to the distance between
beam splitters) labeled in Fig. 7(a), the inferences based upon (69) and (70) can be written
in the form
E¯ ′2 ⇒ d′1, E ′′2 ⇒ d¯′′1, (71)
where E¯ ′2 means that in the Lorentz frame L′ particle b has been detected by E¯ at L-time
t2, an event which in L′ is simultaneous with the event d′1: particle a is in the d arm of its
interferometer at L-time t1. In a similar way, the ′′ events refer to L′′. The assumption of
Lorentz invariance of elements of reality implies that these inferences are still valid if we add
or delete primes from any of the symbols in (71). Combining the two inferences with primes
eliminated is what leads to the paradox. What can one say about this in terms of relativistic
quantum histories?
The inferences in (71) refer to two hyperplanes which cross, and therefore combining
them is a violation of the single family rule as formulated in Sec. III. But, as already noted
in Secs. IV C and V D, one can get around this prohibition when considering local properties,
such as those in (71), by the device of introducing curved hypersurfaces, as in Fig. 7(b). What
is essential is the time order in which d1 precedes E2, and d¯1 precedes E¯2, which is true in any
Lorentz frame (e.g., d′′1 precedes E
′′
2 ), while the relative temporal order of spacelike separated
events, such as d1 and E¯2, is irrelevant, because we are not concerned with entangled states
connecting two spacelike separated regions. To be sure, the wave functions in (69) and (70)
are entangled states in the sense just mentioned. However, their only role in the argument
is that they are a way of calculating (via wave function collapse) certain probabilities of
local properties, probabilities which could be calculated just as well by other methods which
make no reference to entangled states. In the terminology of Sec. 9.4 of [35], the entangled
wave functions in(69) and (70) are pre-probabilities, and one need not think of them as
representing physical reality. Thus each of the inferences in (71) can be justified by appeal
to appropriate conditional probabilities, quite apart from the mathematical method used to
calculate the probabilities.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that one is dealing with local properties and hence the
crossing of hyperplanes is of no concern, one can only, as pointed out in Sec. V D, intercalate
(local or nonlocal) events at additional times into a quantum history if the consistency
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conditions are satisfied. This is a feature of both nonrelativistic and relativistic quantum
theory, and in the present instance it prevents one from combining the two inferences in (71).
Each of these inferences is valid by itself, in the sense that the events to the left and right of⇒
can be placed in a consistent family that confirms the correctness of the inference through
assigning a value of 1 to the corresponding conditional probability. However, the family
required to justify the first inference is incompatible with that required to justify the second,
and the two cannot be combined, as one one would have to do to reach a contradiction.
To be more specific, any consistent history based on the initial state |ψ0〉 of (65) which
includes the event d1 (or d
′
1 or d
′′
1) cannot also include the later event E2 (or E
′
2 or E
′′
2 ). That
is, it makes no sense to say that particle a is earlier in the d arm of its interferometer and
later detected by E. And what is meaningless — an “element of unreality” — in one Lorentz
frame is equally meaningless in another. Each inference in (71) refers to events which are
spacelike separated, so their Heisenberg projectors commute, and for this reason they are
compatible with the consistency conditions. However, the conclusion of the first inference is
incompatible, in the quantum mechanical sense, with the premise of the second inference, so
putting the two together is not possible, and this blocks the path to a logical contradiction.
In summary, Hardy’s relativistic paradox is resolved (or tamed) by paying careful at-
tention to using rules of reasoning that are compatible with the mathematical structure of
quantum theory. In particular, chaining arguments together in a manner which is perfectly
acceptable in classical physics cannot be done in the quantum context without first checking
that they belong to a single framework. That is the basic lesson to be learned from the Bell-
Kochen-Specker result [52], and from the extensive discussion of quantum paradoxes in [35].
Indeed, the procedure used here for resolving the relativistic Hardy paradox is, in its essen-
tials, identical to that used for its nonrelativistic counterpart in Sec. 25.3 of [35], to which
the reader is referred for additional details, including detailed arguments for consistency and
incompatibility of certain families.
By contrast (and contrary to the conclusion of Hardy’s original paper), the assumption
of Lorentz invariance of local elements of reality gives rise to no problems: certain things one
might expect to be the same in different Lorentz frames, such as the presence or absence of
a particle, are indeed the same, or at least the assumption that this is true is not the origin
of the paradox.
VII Summary and Conclusions
VII A Relativistic histories
The rules of nonrelativistic quantum kinematics summarized in Sec. II A have a straightfor-
ward generalization to the relativistic theory provided one adopts the condition, Sec. III A,
that the spacelike hypersurfaces used to build a relativistic family of histories be time or-
dered, or, equivalently, cannot intersect each other. In the nonrelativistic theory the proper
time ordering of events represented by Heisenberg projectors in the product (15) defining
the chain operator is essential if one wants physically reasonable results, and this seems to
demand nonintersecting hypersurfaces in the relativistic version, unless one wishes to con-
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struct an entirely new theory. However, if the Heisenberg operators associated with two
intersecting hypersurfaces commute with one another for the histories one is interested in,
the chain operator will not depend upon their order. In particular, this is true if the Heisen-
berg operators are identical, and that suggests that combining certain unitary families (e.g.,
F0 and F ′0 in Sec. IV C) may make sense. Whether an extension of the rules of Sec. III
A allowing this sort of thing is worthwhile, and if so how best to formulate it, are open
questions.
Locality and local properties are important concepts both for formulating and for resolv-
ing quantum paradoxes. The approach in Sec. III B seems adequate for the purposes of this
paper, but could undoubtedly be improved, especially by making its technical assumptions
more precise and less dependent on lowbrow intuition. Part of this task is to give a proper
mathematical characterization of macrolocality, something which does not look trivial given
the difficulties associated with microlocality, as mentioned in the introduction, though work
by Omne`s [39] may be pointing in the right direction. Another nontrivial task is that of
constructing significant Lorentz-invariant theories satisfying the conditions stated in Sec. III
C, in a way which can be applied to general hypersurfaces and not just to hyperplanes. The
present paper contains nothing useful for this task, unless it be a clarification of what it is
that one is after.
Such unresolved issues should not obscure the fact that the histories approach extends in
a very natural way from nonrelativistic to relativistic quantum theory. The basic formulas
defining histories, Heisenberg chain operators, weights or probabilities, and consistency con-
ditions are formally the same in the nonrelativistic approach as summarized in Sec. II and
in the relativistic extension in Sec. III. Not only are the symbols the same, the associated
concepts are extremely close if not completely identical: the occurrence of events and his-
tories, consistent families or frameworks, refinements, incompatible frameworks, the single
framework rule, and probabilities. Even the examples are similar.
This close connection is hardly surprising given the fact, pointed out in the introduction,
that relativistic versions of the histories approach have been around for some time. Nonethe-
less it is gratifying that some more recent developments first formulated in a nonrelativistic
context — e.g., pre-probabilities and fully consistent schemes for assigning probabilities based
on different sorts of data — can be “relativized” without any difficulty. This straightforward
compatibility stands in marked contrast to the major difficulties which beset attempts to
construct relativistic versions in some other “observer free” quantum interpretations [53,54].
VII B Resolving paradoxes
The three paradoxes resolved, or at least tamed, in Secs. IV, V and VI, are all connected
with the idea that a measurement which takes place in some localized region can have effects
at a distant place spacelike separated from the region in question. And they all invoke some
form of wave function collapse in order to calculate probabilities or make inferences about
the state of affairs at this distant place.
The basic strategy by which the histories approach disarms these paradoxes is by getting
rid of wave function collapse. How to do this is shown in detail for the example considered in
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Sec. IV; see the summary in Sec. IV E. The conclusion is that wave function collapse is not
needed in quantum theory, and that if it is used it should never be thought of as a physical
effect produced by a measurement. Because of its misleading connotations it might be best
to get rid of wave function collapse altogether. There is nothing that can be calculated or
(correctly) inferred using collapse which cannot be calculated or inferred equally well using
conditional probabilities based on fundamental quantum principles that make no reference
to measurements or to collapse. The histories approach can supply physical descriptions that
resemble those of collapse (the G2 families of Secs. IV D or V C), and which help explain why
the use of collapse as a calculational procedure yields correct answers. But it also supplies
alternative descriptions (the F1 and G1 families in these same sections) which are much more
useful for thinking about measurements from a physical point of view, because they show
how a measurement outcome is related to some property of the microscopic system before
the measurement took place. It is, in fact, this latter type of description that experimental
physicists use for designing their equipment and analyzing their data. It is to be regretted
that textbooks which include the rather unrealistic model of nondestructive measurements
going back to von Neumann lack the basic concepts needed to understand, from a quantum
perspective, the devices actually used in practice.
The use of families of the F1 or G1 type, with macrolocal properties both before as well
as after a measurement (if any) takes place, has the further advantage that it simplifies
the discussion of how the description of a quantum system must be altered in a relativistic
theory if one uses a moving coordinate system. For families of this type, with an appropriate
coarse graining in space and time, the quantum description becomes “classical” (as one would
anticipate from the work of Gell-Mann and Hartle [28, 30]), and Lorentz transformations of
particle trajectories behave the same way as in classical relativistic physics. States which
are entangled over macroscopic distances, such as the pre-measurement properties in the G2
families, are not as easy to analyze, but the histories approach provides the tools needed for
using entangled descriptions in a manner consistent with the basic principles of quantum
theory, or combining entangled and local states at different times in histories in the same
framework.
While there are many good reasons for removing wave function collapse from nonrela-
tivistic quantum mechanics, the case is even stronger for a relativistic theory. The use of
collapse understood as some sort of physical phenomenon is one of the main sources of the
widespread notion that the quantum world is inhabited by superluminal influences, leading
to a prima facie conflict with relativity theory. It is then necessary to prove theorems to the
effect that these influences cannot carry information, i.e., they are completely unobservable
phenomena. While a detailed discussion of the (supposed) nonlocality of quantum theory
lies outside the scope of the present paper, it seems clear that to the extent that unob-
servable superluminal influences arise from thinking of wave function collapse as a physical
phenomenon, disposing of the latter will get rid of the former. In any case, if collapse is
not a physical phenomenon, discussions of when it actually occurs [2] are irrelevant to the
physical theory.
Once wave function collapse is out of the way (or has been tamed, should one wish
to continue using it), the resolution of the relativistic EPR and Hardy paradoxes is fairly
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straightforward, using methods similar to those used employed for their nonrelativistic coun-
terparts in Chs. 23 to 25 of [35]. As long as one limits oneself to a single framework, there
is nothing paradoxical about EPR correlations in and of themselves, for they have a simple
classical analog, Sec. V A. The notion that a measurement on particle a somehow influences
particle b can be effectively undermined by noting some of the different frameworks that
provide equally valid descriptions of the quantum time development. In the case of Hardy’s
relativistic paradox the source of the difficulty is not a failure of the Lorentz invariance of
elements of reality, such as the presence or absence of a particle in a given region of space,
but instead a process of reasoning which combines results from incompatible frameworks.
In particular, the problem has to do with what one can meaningful say about the time de-
pendence of the state of a single particle, rather than measurements on a second particle
spacelike separated from the first, and thus relativistic considerations are actually irrelevant
to the fundamental conceptual difficulty. Classical modes of reasoning easily give rise to
contradictions if imported into the quantum domain without regard to the way in which the
mathematics of quantum theory differs from that of classical physics.
We believe that the paradoxes considered in this paper are representative of a larger
class, those in which traditional ideas of measurement and wave function collapse give rise
to contradictions, or to nonlocal influences in apparent conflict with relativity theory. If that
is true, then the methods used here for resolving the paradoxes of wave function collapse,
EPR, and Hardy should work equally well for this larger collection, and help assuage the
concern, seemingly widespread in the quantum foundations community, that quantum theory
and relativity are fundamentally incompatible. The analysis in this paper indicates that the
two go together very well when proper account is taken of the rules which are needed to
make even nonrelativistic quantum mechanics a consistent theory.
There remain, of course, the problems of microlocality, understanding the quantum vac-
uum, constructing field theories using honest mathematics, and the like, whose resolution is
not brought any nearer by anything in this paper. Unless it be indirectly through allowing
a redirection of intellectual energy away from enigmas whose ultimate origin is the unsat-
isfactory manner in which probabilities have traditionally been introduced into quantum
theory, both nonrelativistic and relativistic, and which disappear when this is done in a fully
consistent way.
Acknowledgments
This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation Grant PHY 99-00755.
References
[1] J. A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek, eds., Quantum Theory and Measurement (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1983).
38
[2] K.-E. Hellwig and K. Kraus, “Formal descripton of measurements in local quantum field
theory,” Phys. Rev. D 1, 566 (1970).
[3] Y. Aharonov and D. Z. Albert, “Can we make sense out of the measurement process in
relativistic quantum mechanics?” Phys. Rev. D 24, 359 (1981).
[4] Y. Aharonov and D. Z. Albert, “Is the usual notion of time evolution adequate for
quantum-mechanical systems? II. Relativistic considerations,” Phys. Rev. D 29, 228
(1984).
[5] G. N. Fleming, “Lorentz invariant state reduction and localization,” in PSA 1988,
A. Fine and J. Leplin, eds. (Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Michigan,
1988), vol. 2, pp. 112–126.
[6] L. Vaidman, “Lorentz-invariant “elements of reality” and the joint measurability of
commuting observables,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 70, 3369 (1993).
[7] T. Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, U.K.,
1994).
[8] O. Cohen and B. J. Hiley, “Retrodiction in quantum mechanics, preferred Lorentz
frames, and nonlocal measurements,” Found. Phys. 25, 1669 (1995).
[9] A. Peres, “Relativistic quantum measurements,” in Fundamental Problems in Quantum
Theory, D. M. Greenberger and A. Zeilinger, eds. (New York Academy of Sciences, New
York, 1995), pp. 445–450.
[10] G. Fleming, “Just how radical is hyperplane dependence?” in Perspectives on Quantum
Reality, R. Clifton, ed. (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996), pp. 11–28.
[11] D. Z. Albert, Time and Chance (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
2000).
[12] G. Ghirardi, “Local measurements of nonlocal observables and the relativistic reduction
process,” Found. Phys. 30, 1337 (2000).
[13] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, “Can quantum-mechanical description of phys-
ical reality be considered complete?” Phys. Rev. 47, 777 (1935).
[14] J. S. Bell, “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox,” Physics 1, 195 (1964).
[15] J. F. Clauser, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony, and R. A. Holt, “Proposed experiment to test
local hidden-variable theories,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 23, 880 (1969).
[16] A. Aspect, J. Dalibard, and G. Roger, “Experimental test of Bell’s inequalities using
time-varying analyzers,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 49, 1804 (1982).
39
[17] P. G. Kwiat, K. Mattle, H. Weinfurter, and A. Zeilinger, “New high-intensity source of
polarization-entangled photon pairs,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 4337 (1995).
[18] H. P. Stapp, “Nonlocal character of quantum theory,” Am J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997).
[19] I. Pitowsky, “The relativity of quantum predictions,” Phys. Lett. A 156, 137 (1991).
[20] R. Clifton, C. Pagonis, and I. Pitowsky, “Relativity, quantum mechanics and EPR,”
in Philosophy of Science Asociation 1992, D. Hull, M. Forbes, and K. Okruhlik, eds.
(Philosophy of Science Asociation, East Lansing, Michigan, 1992), vol. I, pp. 114–128.
[21] L. Hardy, “Quantum mechanics, local realistic theories and Lorentz-invariant realistic
theories,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 2981 (1992).
[22] J. von Neumann, Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 1932).
[23] F. London and E. Bauer, La The´orie de l’Observation en Me´canique Quantique (Her-
mann & Cie, Paris, 1939).
[24] For a clear introduction to the basic issues see [25], and for a clear statement of the lack
of progress, consult [26].
[25] E. P. Wigner, “The problem of measurement,” Am. J. Phys. 31, 6 (1963).
[26] P. Mittelstaedt, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the Measurement Pro-
cess (Cambridge, Cambridge, U.K., 1998).
[27] R. B. Griffiths, “Consistent histories and the interpretation of quantum mechanics,” J.
Stat. Phys. 36, 219 (1984).
[28] M. Gell-Mann and J. B. Hartle, “Quantum Mechanics in the Light of Quantum Cos-
mology,” in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information., W. H. Zurek, ed.
(Addison-Wesley, 1990), pp. 425–458.
[29] R. Omne`s, “Consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 64,
339 (1992).
[30] M. Gell-Mann and J. B. Hartle, “Classical equations for quantum systems,” Phys. Rev.
D 47, 3345 (1993).
[31] R. Omne`s, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1994).
[32] R. B. Griffiths, “Consistent Histories and Quantum Reasoning,” Phys. Rev. A 54, 2759
(1996).
[33] R. B. Griffiths, “Choice of consistent family, and quantum incompatibility,” Phys. Rev.
A 57, 1604 (1998).
40
[34] R. Omne`s, Understanding Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1999).
[35] R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
U.K., 2002).
[36] M. Redhead, “More ado about nothing,” Found. Phys. 25, 123 (1995).
[37] G. N. Fleming, “Reeh-Schlieder meets Newton-Wigner,” Phil. Sci. 67, S495 (2000).
[38] G. C. Hegerfeldt, “Ensemble versus individual system in quantum optics,” Fortschr.
Phys. 46, 595 (1998).
[39] R. Omne`s, “Localisation of relativistic particles,” J. Math. Phys. . 38, 707 (1997).
[40] J. B. Hartle, “The quantum mechanics of cosmology,” in Quantum Cosmology and Baby
Universes, S. Coleman, J. Hartle, T. Piran, and S. Weinberg, eds. (World Scientific,
Singapore, 1991), pp. 65–157.
[41] M. Blencowe, “The consistent histories interpretation of quantum fields in curved space-
time,” Ann. Phys. (N.Y.) 211, 87 (1991).
[42] R. B. Griffiths, “Consistent quantum counterfactuals,” Phys. Rev. A 60, 5 (1999).
[43] If the Hilbert space is infinite-dimensional, properties are represented by closed sub-
spaces. We shall, in the interests of brevity and ease of exposition, hereafter leave to the
mathematically sophisticated reader the task of supplying qualifications of this sort.
[44] G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, “The logic of quantum mechanics,” Annals of Math.
37, 823 (1936).
[45] C. J. Isham, “Quantum logic and the histories approach to quantum theory,” J. Math.
Phys. 35, 2157 (1994).
[46] R. Haag, Local Quantum Physics (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992), Sec. II.1.
[47] See the report of Einstein’s remarks at the 1927 Solvay Congress in [48], pp. 115ff.
[48] M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (Wiley, New York, 1974).
[49] R. H. Dicke, “Interaction-free quantum measurements: a paradox?” Am. J. Phys. 49,
925 (1981).
[50] In order to simplify the discussion we are assuming that the time required for decay
is much shorter than the time required for the particle to reach one of the detectors.
This need not be the case. For example, a nucleus undergoing alpha decay may have a
lifetime of several seconds or longer, and in this case the collapse picture leads to the
odd conclusion that detection of the alpha particle produces an instantaneous effect at
the decaying nucleus. The histories approach allows one to view such processes in a
manner which seems physically more realistic; see Sec. 12.4 of [35].
41
[51] D. Bohm, Quantum Theory (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1951).
[52] N. D. Mermin, “Hidden variables and the two theorems of John Bell,” Rev. Mod. Phys.
65, 803 (1993).
[53] D. Du¨rr, S. Goldstein, K. Mu¨nch-Berndl, and N. Zangh`ı, “Hypersurface Bohm-Dirac
models,” Phys. Rev. A 60, 2729 (1999).
[54] P. Pearle, “Relativistic collapse model with tachyonic features,” Phys. Rev. A 59, 80
(1999).
42
